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COMMENT.
It is an old proverb that law is an uncertain science, but it is
-not often that it has as striking an illustration as is afforded by a
question, we could hardly call it a decision, which came from the
Supreme Court of Missouri a few weeks since. As the point is an
interesting and live one we give the case [Berry v. Missouri Pacific
Railroad CO., 25 S. W. Rep. 229 (Mo.)] somewhat in detail. It
was an action against a railway company for negligently causing
the death of plaintiff's husband. The deceased met with his acci-
dent while riding on a flat car attached to a construction train.
He paid no fare, but was riding with the knowledge and assent of
the conductor. The lower court ruled that he was a passenger.
Three judges of the Supreme Court were of the opinion that he
was a mere trespasser and that recovery could be had only on
proof of gross negligence; two judges considered that, as he was
on the train with the consent of the conductor, he was entitled to
ordinary care, and favored affirming the judgment against the
company; another was of the same opinion as to the liability of
the company but favored reversing the judgment on the ground
that the ruling that deceased was a passenger was an "undue
advantage" to the plaintiff. Still another member of the court, in
a well written and ingeniously argued opinion, favored the theory
that deceased was a passenger, stating the settled propositions that
payment of fare is not necessary to constitute one a passenger, and
that a person becomes such when he is carried on a passenger train
(or if the custom of the road permits, on a freight train,) with the
consent of the conductor, attempted to bring this case within them.
"The ultimate test by which all doubtful cases should be determined
resolves itself into a question of good faith on the part of the
person claiming to be a passenger, based on the acts, representa-
tions and appearances for which the carrier is responsible. If
from these acts representations and appearances made or held
forth by the carrier, a person riding with the express or implied
consent of the conductor is justified in believing that this consent
is in accord with his duty and authority as a conductor and not in
YALE LAW JO URNAL.
fraud of the regulations and rights of the carrier, then he should
be recognized in the fullest sense as a passenger." The other
opinions disapproved of the passenger theory on the ground that
this was a construction train and not intended or permitted to be
used in carrying passengers.
The case of Wright et al. v. Wrigh, 58 N. W. Rep. 34, (Mich.)
was an action of waste brought to restrain the defendant from
committing waste by cutting and removing timber from land to
which, as heirs, the plaintiffs laid claim. The manifest purpose
of the suit was to ascertain the respective rights of the parties.
The facts in the case were these: Phineas Wright in 1868 entered
into an agreement in the form of an indenture with the superin-
tendent of the poor of the county to receive the defendant, who at
that time was under two years of age, into his family, until he
became twenty-one years old. In 1875, acting under a statute
then in force, he and his wife filed a petition in the.probate court
declaring their intention to make the defendant their heir at law
and praying that his name be changed to theirs. The order was
granted, and the defendant continued to live with him, being
treated as his son, and never being informed that he was not,
until, when he was twenty-two years old, Phineas Wright died.
The statute under which the defendant was adopted was declared
unconstitutional in People v. Congdan, 77 Mich. 357,. and the heirs of
decedent attempted to take advantage of this, and enforce their
claim to his land. The court, after describing the relations of the
parties, and the intentions of decedent and his wife, as appeared
from the evidence, said: "We think there may be said to be a
contract, impliedly at least, that defendant was to have this property
and that there had been such a performance on the part of the
defendant as to take the case out of the statute of frauds. If this
arrangement, so solemnly made by Mr. and Mrs. Wright, cannot
be carried out,-if strangers may now step in and take this inheri-
tance, which the defendant has been led to believe would be his
-the defendant would be most outrageously wronged. He has
lived since his adoption upon this farm,. in the full belief, that
he was under his own father's roof and in the full expectation
and belief that, as a son and only child, he would inherit it. It
would be technical, indeed, to say, from all these circumstances,
no contract could be implied which a ,court of equity would enforce
to save the rights of the defendant." Several cases are quoted to.
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sustain this opinion, from which two justices dissented, but it is
evident that the court departed -from the strict rules of positive law
to prevent an injustice being done to the defendant, and stretched
the meaning and effect of the facts to bring them within the pro-
tection of the law. The transactions of the parties, as is pointed
out in the dissenting opinion, were insufficient to constitute a con-
tract of any other kind than a mere nudum actum which would be
insufficient, notwithstanding the intentions of the decedent, to
secure the rights of the defendant, as he expected under the statute
which was adjudged unconstitutional.
In the case of Fisher, Brown &- Co. v. Fielding, recently decided
in the Superior Court of Connecticut, the defendant, a citizen of
Connecticut, while temporarily in England was served with
process there, and in default of appearance a judgment was ren-
dered against him. Suit was, brought on this judgment in Con-
necticut and the point to be determined was whether the English
court had jurisdiction over the defendant. To. be more specific,
would mere service of process upon a citizen of the United States
while temporarily within a foreign country, confer upon the court
jurisdiction to render a judgment which would be binding in the
United States ? It appears that in all former cases in which the
courts have determined questions of jurisdiction over the parties
with reference to the validity of a foreign judgment rendered
against them, the defendant was not only served with process but
actually appeared and litigated the cause. The court (G. W.
Wheeler, Judge,) reviewed the authorities at great length and
determined that jurisdiction having once attached by reason of
service within the foreign country, the judgment rendered was a
valid one and binding on the courts of Connecticut. The fact that
it was taken by default did not effect the case. In concluding,
Judge Wheeler says: "We have already shown that the courts of
Connecticut have not determined directly this question, but they
have often declared the principles which govern this case; that
jurisdiction of the cause and person is the foundation of a conclu-
sive judgment; that the decision of a court of competent jurisdic-
tion is final upon the parties to the action; that a cause once tried
by such a court cannot again be contested in the same court or any
other. * * * What reasons can be deduced why these princi-
ples should not be of equal force -whether the judgment be that of
our State, our Sister States or a foreign country? * * * The
defendant who has entered into contract relations with the plaintiff,
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who has received notice of the action against him, who had the
right to appear, who had the right to defend, who had the right
to have the judgment set aside for irregularity, who had the right
to appeal, escapes all liability under the judgment rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction. A litigant who had a fair oppor-
tunity to try his cause before a competent tribunal, should
acquiesce in the result, and if he has reason to complain should
pursue those means for correcting error provided by the jurispru-
dence of the tribunal, instead of resorting to another court. * *
* The court having once acquired jurisdiction of the cause cannot
be deprived of this by the subsequent action of the defendant in
refusing to litigate the cause." This reason is obviously sound and
in accordance with the modern idea of giving validity to foreign
judgments on account of justice and expediency.
